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   ABSTRACT
The  emergence  of  powerful  financial  conglomerates  operating  at  a  global  level  has  led  to  unified  
supervision of financial services in the UK and Germany. These changes in regulatory structures have a  
higher potential of better utilisation through the involvement of external auditors. The crucial role played by 
external auditors in banking regulation and supervision has been highlighted in bank collapses  like BCCI  
and Barings. According to the Basel Core Principles   for effective Banking Supervision 1997, an effective  
banking supervisory system should consist of both “on-site” and “off-site” supervision. Off-site supervision  
involves the regulator making use of external auditors. On-site work is usually done by the examination staff  
of the bank supervisory agency or commissioned by supervisors but may be undertaken by external auditors.  
Following Enron's collapse, debates focussed around why the UK had avoided its Enron. Many argued that  
it was because the US approach to accounting regulation was rules-based in comparison to the principles-
based  system  of  the  UK  .  In  addition  to  adopting  an  independent  standard  setting,  the  International  
Accounting Standards Board's second principle is aimed at principles as opposed to rules based standards.  
All public trading companies in the European Union would have to apply new international standards from 
2005 in consolidated financial statements ( EC Regulation 1606/2002) and huge efforts are now being made  
towards global convergence.
INTRODUCTION
This article aims to explore the roles  of external auditors and international accounting bodies in financial 
regulation and supervision. The growth of multinational enterprises has to a significant extent, led  to the 
internationalisation of  auditing.2 The demand for  international  auditing has  also resulted to  IOSCO, the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions considering the removal of barriers for international 
capital markets.3 IOSCO is also working closely with the IFAC, the International Federation of Accountants 
as regards international standards on auditing.4 International auditing standards have come into force as it is 
important for multinational enterprises and particularly, international auditing firms to have no differences in 
auditing   requirements  between countries.5 This  would  also  avoid  any  problems of  inconsistencies  and 
misinterpretation during  the process of applying these standards. 
Sections of this paper are organised as follows : In the first section, the role of the auditor will be considered. 
This will include factors which are important if this role is to be achieved. Such factors include objectivity, 
integrity and independence. Brief definitions of these factors will also be given. In the second section, the 
trend of regulation and supervision in certain jurisdictions and the reasons for adopting a single regulator 
model are amongst the  issues to be discussed. The third section would not only discuss 'regulatory capture' 
and consider how the external auditor could help the financial regulator avoid the pitfalls of “regulatory 
capture”, but also why the regulator should be employing greater use of the external auditor. Section four 
then discusses  how  the collapse of  Enron led to the realisation of the need to embrace international auditing 
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and accounting standards. In the fifth section, international convergence issues and challenges facing the 
International Accounting Standards Board will be considered before a conclusion is given.
A)   THE ROLE OF THE AUDITOR
The Role of the Audit
The primary aim of the audit today is the verification of financial statements. The audit is an important part 
of the capital market framework as it not only reduces the cost of information exchange between managers 
and shareholders but also provides a signalling mechanism to the markets that the information which 
management is providing is reliable.6 The auditor provides independent verification on the financial 
statements of a company and as a result, the audit loses its value when such independence which gives 
credibility to the financial statements, is undermined. According to accounting literature, the traditional role 
of the audit was mainly the detection and prevention of fraud.7 The move to verification of financial 
statements arose from the growing investment in the railway, insurance and banking industry8. Suggestions 
have been made that this situation occurred because in these particular industries, the shareholding was more 
dispersed and more priority given to financial performance rather than on management's honesty.9 Bank 
failures such as those of BCCI and Johnson Matthey resulted to a re-think of the objective of an audit to 
include the detection and prevention of fraud.10
Factors  Affecting the  External Auditor's Role
The   role   of   the   external   auditor   in   the   supervisory   process   requires   standards   such   as 
independence,objectivity  and  integrity  to be  achieved. Even  though  the  regulator  and  external  auditor 
perform  similar   functions,  namely the  verification  of    financial   statements,  they  serve  particular 
interests. The  regulator  works  towards  safeguarding  financial  stability  and  investor  interests.  On  the 
other  hand, the external  auditor  serves  the  private  interests  of  the  shareholders  of  a company. The 
financial  audit   remains  an  important  aspect  of  corporate  governance  that  makes  management 
accountable  to  shareholders  for  its  stewardship  of  a  company11.  The  external  auditor  may  however, 
have  a  commercial  interest  too. The debate surrounding the role of external auditors focusses in particular 
on auditor independence. A  survey  by  the  magazine “Financial  Director”  shows  that  the  fees  derived 
from  audit  clients in  terms  of  non-audit  services  are  significant  in  comparison  with  fees  generated 
through  auditing.12  Accounting  firms  sometimes  engage  in  a  practice  called  “low  balling”  whereby 
they  set  audit  fees  at  less  than  the market  rate  and  make  up  for  the  deficit  by  providing  non  audit 
services.  As  a  result, some  audit  firms  have  commercial  interests  to  protect  too. There  is  concern  
that the auditor's interests to protect shareholders of a company and his commercial interests  do  not  conflict 
with each  other.  Sufficient  measures  need  to  be  in  place  to  ensure  that  the  external  auditor's 
independence  is  not  affected. Brussels proposed a new directive for auditors to try to prevent further 
scandals such as those of Enron and Parmalat.13 The new directive states that all firms listed on the stock 
market  must  have  independent  audit  committees  which  will  recommend  an  auditor  for  shareholder 
6 V Beattie and  S Fearnley 'Auditor Independence and Non Audit Services' pg 1.( See 
<http://www.icaew.co.uk/publicassets/00/00/03/64/0000036464.PDF>)
7 D Singh  'The Role of Third Parties in Banking Regulation and Supervision' Journal of International Banking 
Regulation  Volume 4 No 3 , 2003, at pg 8 at p 3
8 Ibid   p  3
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12  D Singh  'The Role of Third Parties in Banking Regulation and Supervision'  Journal of International Banking 
Regulation  Volume 4 No 3 , 2003, at pg 8
13  H Tomlinson 'Brussels Seeks To Tighten Audit Rules'  The Guardian  March 17 2004
approval.14 It also states that auditors or audit partners must be rotated but does not mention the separation of 
auditors from consultancy work despite protests that there is a link to compromising the independence of 
auditors.15  However this may be because Brussels also shares the view that there is no evidence confirming 
correlation between levels of non-audit fees and audit failures and that as a result, sufficient safeguards are in 
place.16
Definitions of Integrity, Objectivity and Independence
In the UK, the APB Ethical Standards govern issues relating to the integrity, objectivity and independence of 
auditors.17 Guidance on other ethical matters and statements of fundamental ethical principles governing the 
work of all professional accountants are issued by professional accountancy bodies.18 
Integrity is a  requirement for those acting in public interest and it is vital that auditors act and are seen to act 
with integrity.19 This requires not only honesty but  a wide range of qualities such as fairness,  candour, 
courage, intellectual honesty and confidentiality.20
Objectivity is a state of mind which excludes bias,  prejudice and compromise and which gives fair and 
impartial consideration to all matters that are relevant to the present task, disregarding those that are not.21 
Objectivity requires the auditor's judgement not to be affected by conflicts of interests and that he adopts a 
thorough approach preparing to disagree where necessary with the director's judgements.22 The necessity for 
objectivity  arises  due  to  the  fact  that  many  important  issues  involved  in  the  preparation  of  financial 
statements do not relate to questions of fact but rather to questions of judgement.23
The concept of independence is not the easiest to define. Definitions include :24 “the conditional probability 
of  reporting  a  discovered  breach”  by  DeAngelo  (1981a  :  186);  the  ability  to  resist  client  pressure 
(Knapp;1985) ; a function of character – with characteristics of integrity and trustworthiness being essential 
(Magill and Previts; 1991) ; and an absence of interests that create an unacceptable risk of bias.25  The need 
for independence arises because in many cases, users of financial statements and other third parties do not 
have sufficient information to enable them judge whether the auditors are, in fact, objective.26 The reality and 
notion of auditor independence is vital to public confidence in financial reporting.27 Public confidence in 
financial markets and the conduct of public interest entities relies partly on the credibility of the opinions and 
14     ibid
15  ibid
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Arrangements For Financial Regulation of Public Limited Companies in the United Kingdom at pg 20 and  House of 
Commons Hansard Debates for 19 Oct 2004 (pt 17)
 ( <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/cgi-bin/>)
17 Ethical Statement 1 Integrity, objectivity and independence paragraph  5 
<http://www.asb.co.uk/apb/publications/index.cfm>
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24 V Beattie, S.Fearnley, R Brandt 'Behind Closed Doors : What Company Audit is Really About'  Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (2001) at p 19
25 The AICPA White Paper definition (AICPA, 1997) defines independence as an absence of interests that create an 
unacceptable risk of bias.
26 Ethical Statement 1 Integrity, objectivity and independence paragraph  13 
<http://www.asb.co.uk/apb/publications/index.cfm>
27   D Singh  'The Role of Third Parties in Banking Regulation and Supervision' Journal of International Banking 
Regulation  Volume 4 No 3 , 2003, at  pg 18
reports given by auditors in relation with financial audits.28 
B)   DEVELOPMENTS LEADING  TO THE ADOPTION OF A SINGLE REGULATOR MODEL IN 
CERTAIN JURISDTIONS
The Rationale For a Single Financial Services Regulator 
'If  a  conglomerate  provides  such financial  services  as  banking,  securities,  investment  management,  and 
insurance,  the  various  authorities  responsible  for  each  financial  sector  need  an  integrated  approach  to 
regulation and supervision' .29 Conglomerates are  referred to as  heterogeneous financial  groups whose 
activities  for  the  most  part,  span  all  institutional  sectors.30 Factors  such  as  the  growth  of  financial 
conglomerates and the derivatives markets fuelled by the impact of information technology and increased 
competition have triggered a change in the way supervision is carried  out around the globe. In addition, 
bank collapses have also contributed to a re - think in the structure of financial regulation , that is, the way in 
which financial regulation is carried out. 
In 1997, the UK government announced the adoption of a single regulator known as the Financial Services 
Authority,  the  FSA, to  oversee  the  regulation  and  supervision  of  the  financial  system.  The  subsequent 
establishment of the Financial Services Authority and enactment of the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000 became fully operational in December 2001. The rationale for a single financial regulator includes 
inter alia the greater level of ease and efficiency with which a “single regulator” can regulate bank financial-
conglomerates compared to a system where a multiple number of regulators exist.
The move towards a single regulator is not unique to the UK but is a trend that has gathered pace in the 
international capital markets. In Germany, the amalgamation of banks, securities and insurance supervisors, 
with the establishment of a single financial markets supervisory authority known as the Federal Agency for 
Financial Market Supervision, has taken place. In Italy, there has been a move towards deregulation with the 
so-called ‘de-specialization’ of the banking system, which is the first step towards a possible single financial 
regulator being set up.
Reasons Prompting a  Regulatory Change
Reasons  prompting  regulatory  change   are  usually  interlinked.  The  origins  of  international  regulatory 
convergence process can  be  traced  back  to  a  sequence of  bank  crises namely, the collapses of Bankhaus 
Herstatt in Germany, Franklin  National Bank in  the  US,  the  secondary banking  crisis in  the UK and the 
28 Ethical Statement 1 Integrity, objectivity and independence paragraph  4 
<http://www.asb.co.uk/apb/publications/index.cfm>
29 DH Scott ' The Regulation and Supervision of Domestic Financial Conglomerates' (Policy Research Working Paper 
No 1329 The World Bank Financial Sector Development Department August 1994)
30 See 'Supervision of Financial Services in the OECD Area'< http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/27/1939320.pdf> ( 20 
April 2006)
collapse  of  Banco  Ambrosiano  in  Italy  in  the  early  1980s.31
These reasons will now be considered. 
(i) Developments in financial markets:
As  markets  have  liberalised  and  traditional  banking  business has become less  profitable, the line 
between banking  and  other  financial  services  is  becoming less  and  less distinguishable. As noted by 
Vieten32, there are many reasons as to why a regulatory response is required. The Big  Bang (the reform of 
the London Stock Exchange), focussed on the pace of change in the  financial services industry and the 
differences between the environment in which many regulatory systems came into  being  and  that  in which 
they  are  currently  working.33
As  a  result  of  globalisation,  there  is  need  for  all  regulators  to  take  account  of  the whole of  a  
group’s  activities in assessing  the  risk  faced  by  the institutions  they  authorised. This  was emphasised 
in  the Barings  Case where  the collapse of  the  group  was  due to malpractices in  a  single  subsidiary. The 
issue of group structures was also highlighted in the BCCI Case.
Thirty  years  ago,  financial  markets  were  more  distinguishable:  there  was  clearer  distinction  between 
commercial  banks  and  securities  firms.  There  was  also  a  further  distinction  between institutions  which 
catered  for  wholesale  customers  like  merchant  banks  and  those  which  catered  for  retail  markets  like 
commercial  banks.34 Supervision  focussed  then  on  the  activities  of  the  commercial  banks  rather  than 
securities firms. As deregulation has opened up financial markets to competition from both domestic and 
foreign institutions, such previous distinctions have become blurred. Deregulation has also promoted the 
cross-border flow of capital and attracted investors to seek rewards in overseas markets.35  
Improvements in information technology have also played a crucial role in  encouraging  both  trading  of 
financial   instruments   across   national   boundaries  and   also  development  of  new products  including 
derivative instruments.36 Key  difficulties  however  relate  to  identifying  and  quantifying  the  risks 
associated  with  holding  such  financial  instruments.37 
(ii) Bank Collapses
 The collapse of  JMB, BCCI and Barings triggered a regulatory response. However, it is also helpful to 
consider the causes of these collapses in evaluating the proper remedies for those collapses. Some causes 
31 C Hadjiemmanuil Banking Regulation and the Bank of England (Lloyds of London Press 1995) 53
32 HR Vieten Banking Regulation in Britain and Germany Compared : Capital Ratios, External Audit and Internal 
Controls (1997) 8
33 Treasury Committee Barings Bank and International Regulation (Report No 1, 1996) xxii
34 Treasury Committee List of Memoranda included in the Minutes of Evidence (Report No 1, 1996) 200 -201
35 ibid
36 ibid
37 ibid
may not necessarily have warranted the creation of a single regulator. A specialist regulator may have failed 
to  prevent  some failures  –  not  because it  is  incapable of  doing so or  not  because it  is  not  sufficiently 
equipped to do so, but because of the style of supervision adopted by such regulator.  In other words, a 
change in style of supervision may be all that was needed to remedy the regulatory problems encountered by 
the Bank of England. Where lack of sufficient expertise about other sectors (insurance, investment or other 
sectors) contributed to inability to supervise efficiently, then that could warrant the creation of a “mega” 
regulator such as the FSA. In this case, the expertise from different required sectors could be enhanced and 
combined more efficiently.
(iii)International and European Regulatory Convergence Processes
Vieten notes three main factors driving the harmonization of banking supervision in Britain and Germany 
namely:38 agreements of the Basle Committee, banking law directives  issued  by  the European Union  and 
perceived  competitive  pressure  to  conform  to  internationally accepted market principles. As also stated 
by  Vieten,  harmonization  initiatives  do  not  necessarily  indicate  convergence  of  banking  supervision  as 
individual countries integrate the capital adequacy ratio into their  regulatory  systems  in  different  ways.39 
In certain cases such as new rules being drafted on capital adequacy for banks, there is indeed a limit to the 
usefulness of convergence – as factors affecting such rules may vary from country to country.
In response to the Bankhaus Herstatt collapse, an adhoc committee, the Committee on Banking Regulation 
and Supervisory Practices came into being.40 This consisted of governors of the central banks of the Group of 
Ten (“G-10”) countries and Switzerland and was formed at the end of 1974.41  The Committee came to be 
known as the “Basle Committee”. The  purpose  of  the  Basle  Committee  is  to  provide  a  means  whereby 
study  of  international  aspects  of  prudential  regulation  and  discussion  of  issues  could  be  undertaken 
between  participating  national  authorities.42 This  was  aimed  at  elaborating  common  principles  related 
to  strengthening  bank  supervision  and  harmonising  prudential  standards .
Three  elements  are  essential  to  convergence.43 These  are:  a  common  definition  of  capital,  a  common 
framework for measuring capital adequacy and a common minimum standard. Over the years the work of the 
Basle Committee has extended to cover non-credit risks undertaken by banks.44 This was in response to the 
development  in  the  global  markets – with  the advent of  the growth of  financial  conglomerates .
As  a  result  of  global  changes  and  development  in  global  financial  markets  and  activities  of  banks,  
38 HR Vieten Banking Regulation in Britain and Germany Compared : Capital Ratios, External Audit and Internal 
Controls (1997)  7
39 ibid
40 C Hadjiemmanuil Banking Regulation and the Bank of England (Lloyds of London press 1995)  55
41 ibid
42 ibid p 55 - 56
43 ibid p 63
44 especially in relation to banks’ securities business; ibid p 68
the  scope  of  bank  supervision  has  also  developed. Two  areas  relevant  to  this  section  are  initiatives 
put  forward  by  the  Basle  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision  and  the  European  Union  and  domestic 
developments  in  the  UK.45 With  respect  to  the  Basle  Committee  and  the  European  Union, directives 
issued  must  be  taken  into  consideration  but  Basle  guidelines  are  not  legally  binding  in  the  national 
states  concerned. 
Such  environmental  and  global  changes  discussed  above ( which  will  be  classified  as  external 
factors) and  which  may  affect  industry  structure,  should  be  distinguished  from  internal  factors (for 
example,  lack  of  proper  implementation  of  internal  controls) which  result  from  within  a  particular 
company - in  considering  an  appropriate  regulatory  response.
iv)  The  system  prevailing  then  was  not  delivering  the  standards  of  investor  protection  or  supervision 
which  both  the  industry  and  public  deserved.  This  reason  would  also  naturally  incorporate  failures 
to  achieve  other  objectives  of  financial  regulation  such  as  sustaining  system  stability  and  maintaining 
the  safety  and  soundness  of  financial  institutes.46 
v  ) The  distinction  between  different  types  of  financial  institutions  and  the  products  which  they 
offered  was  getting  increasingly  blurred :  this  called  for  a  move  from  supervision  which  was  based 
on  institutional  types.
vi) The  increasingly  global  nature  of  the  financial  services  sector  also  called  for  a  change.
vii) Consolidated  prudential  supervision of  multi-functional  financial  groups  would  provide an  efficient 
way of managing risks related to different  financial  activities.47 
viii) The  extent  to  which  financial  products  and  contracts  are  significantly  different  from  general  
goods  and  services (these  general  goods  and  services  not  being  regulated  to  the  same  degree  as  
financial  institutions).
The External Auditor's Role in Helping to Avoid Regulatory Capture
Many questions have been raised in relation to a single regulator's ability to be held accountable – given the 
all  embracing  nature  its  role  and  concentration  of  powers.   Such  questions  include48 whether  a  single 
regulator could be made sufficiently accountable to industry whilst avoiding regulatory capture. The external 
auditor  can  play  an  important  intermediary  role  in  the  financial  regulatory  and  supervisory  process  by 
45 Treasury Committee Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence (1996) 201
46 Research Paper (99/68) 21,22
47 ibid p 12
48 See E Ferran ‘Examining the UK’s Experience in Adopting the Single Financial Regulator Model’ at p 24
helping the regulator avoid regulatory capture.
Regulatory capture is generally defined as capture of the regulator by the regulated. The theory of regulatory 
capture was introduced by Richard Posner,49 who argued that ‘regulation is not about the public interest at 
all, but is a process, by which interest groups seek to promote their private interest ...'  Characteristics of 
situations where regulatory capture is likely to occur include50 : Where: only one industry is being regulated, 
where the regulator is part of a larger organisation, where there is  conflict  between  regulator and  the  
regulated, where regular contact occurs between the regulator and  the regulated and/or where a regular 
exchange of personnel occurs between the  regulator  and  the  regulated.
In assessing the role of the external auditor in financial regulation and supervision, it is important to consider 
not only the type of regulator but  the system of supervision. 
The External Auditor's Role According To the System of Supervision
According  to  the  Basle  Core  Principles  for  effective  Banking  Supervision  1997,  an  effective  banking 
supervisory  system  should  consist  of  some  kind  of  both  “on-site”  and  “off-site”  supervision.  Off-site 
supervision involves the regulator making use of external auditors.  On-site work is usually done by the 
examination staff of the bank supervisory agency or commissioned by supervisors but may be undertaken by 
external auditors. 
The systems in the UK and Germany both involve both on-site and off-site supervision whilst Italy to a 
greater degree, is based on the on-site system (even though it still makes use of external auditors). The US 
position is based on an on-site system of supervision and is focussed on the aim of using external audit to 
examine financial institutions, but it does not extend beyond that (as it does in the UK where extra auditor 
functions are acquired).51
In Switzerland however,  the banks' external auditors are said to “ act as eyes and ears of the Swiss Federal 
Banking Commission (SFBC) or at least  provide extra eyes and ears”.52  The Swiss supervisor depends a lot 
on  the  external  auditor's  supply  of  information  and  the  external  auditors  carry  out  regular  and  direct 
supervisory functions. This approach is more in line with the requirements of the Basle Core Principles for 
effective Banking Supervision.
49 See  R. Posner  'Theories of economic regulation' (1974) 5  Bell  Journal of Economics and Management Science pp 
335-358; G. Stigler ' The theory of economic regulation' (1971) 2 Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 
pp 3-21;   J Laffont and J Tirole  ' The Politics of Government Decision Making : A Theory of Regulatory Capture' 
(1991) 106 Quarterly Journal of Economics pp 1089-1127. 
50 I Ayres and  J Braithwaite  Responsive Regulation : Transcending the Deregulation Debate   ( New York : Oxford 
Union Press 1992) at pg  115
51  More information  on this : D Singh  'Banking Regulation of UK Financial Markets '.
52 EHG Huepkes ' The External Auditor and the Bank Supervisor :  Sherlock Holmes and Doctor Watson?'   Journal of  
Banking Regulation, Volume 7 No 1 / 2 2005  pg 11
C) PROBLEMS IN ENRON AND THE NEED FOR EMBRACING INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS
The collapse of Enron raised consideration of the following points namely :53 
The regulation of auditors : Enron highlighted the fact that self-regulation and peer review in the US were 
no longer enough 
Eliminating conflicts of interests in accounting firms;
Compulsory rotation of auditors – as Andersen had audited Enron since its establishment in 1983; and
Revisiting America's Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.
The collapse  of  Enron also led to suggestions that  the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),  its 
standard-setting  body  –  the  Financial  Accounting  Standards  Board  may  have  to  look  to  embracing 
international accounting standards.54
Accounting Practice in the UK and the US
Following the collapse of Enron, a lot of comparisons were drawn between the principles based approach 
which exists in the UK and the US rules-based approach. Under David Tweedie's guidance during the 1990s, 
the UK Accounting Standards Board developed accounting standards which relied heavily on rules but still 
looked at the substance of the transactions, and if the rules did not produce the right answer, then one would 
have to look to the substance to produce the answer.55 One of the major problems with Enron was the off 
balance-sheet debt which resulted from direct following of rules without being able because the accounting 
standards did not permit, to consider the substance of the transaction.56  Many of the differences between the 
UK and US practices resulted directly from the changes driven by major corporate collapses of the 80s and 
early 1990s57 and such differences need to be considered when deciding whether to adopt certain post Enron 
reforms.
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)
The IASB operates according to two principles namely:58An independent standard setting and on principle 
based standards. The independent standard setting comprises of independent board members; the occurrence 
of all board meetings in public; a thorough due process; private funding and no political influence.59 The 
second principle of principle based standards tries to establish principles that drive the standards. The IASB 
aims to develop high quality, understandable global accounting standards which require transparent and 
comparable information , in the public interest.60
The year 2005 was a year of major change for many companies with the introduction of international 
accounting standards and new auditing standards.61  Countries planning to require IFRS for all domestic 
listed companies in 2005 include:62 European Union members; new EU members; European Economic Area 
(EEA) members -which include Iceland, Liechstenstein and Norway; Australia and South Africa. New 
Zealand and Canada hope to do so in 2007. A lot of work is currently being done between the Securities and 
53 “ Enron : The real scandal”       The Economist  Jan 17th  2002 
<http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=940091>
54 ibid
55 House of Commons Select Committee on Treasury; Examination of Witnesses : Mr Michael Groom, Mr Peter 
Wyman, Mr David Bishop, Mr Roger Adams, Mr Bruce Epsley and Mr Richard Mallett, Wednesday  10 April 2002 
pg 1
56 Ibid  p 2
57 House of Commons Select Committee on Treasury , Memorandum submitted by the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales  pg 3
58  K Dasgupta and N Whelan 'A Strategic Overview of the New Accountancy Regulations'  Paper Presented at the 
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, Russell Square on the 25th May 2005
59  ibid
60 See <http://www.iasb.org/about/index.asp> (last visited August 20 2006>
61 See FRC Annual Report 2005/ 2006
62  K Dasgupta and N Whelan 'A Strategic Overview of the New Accountancy Regulations'  Paper presented at the 
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, Russell Square on the 25th May 2005
Exchange Commission, FASB and IASB to eliminate differences which exist between themselves. 
Advantages of such convergence include:63 The attraction of investment by transparency; the support of 
cross-border investments; the reduction of cost of capital and the reduction of operational expenses.
D)   INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE EFFORTS
In  the  UK,  the  Accounting  Standards  Board,  the  ASB,  is  working  hard  to  harmonise  standards  with 
International Financial Reporting Standards, IFRSs. EC Regulation 1606/2002 states that all publicly traded 
companies must apply IFRSs from 2005 in consolidated financial statements. Apart from the convergence 
efforts in Europe, huge efforts are also being made to converge standards with US GAAP.
International  Financial  Reporting  Standards  32 and 39 ( IFRS 32 and  39)
Two International  Financial  Reporting  Standards  (  IFRS 32  and  IFRS 39)  deal  with  off-balance  sheet 
instruments. Off balance sheet instruments created problems in the Parmalat and Enron cases as they were 
not reflected in the balance sheet – even though sizes could have been as large as two to three times global 
GDP. The standards bring the financial instruments under the balance sheet.
Challenges  Facing  the  International  Accounting  Standards  Board
One of the biggest challenges facing the International Accounting Standards Board will be reconciling IFRS 
32 and 39 globally – with the US in particular.  Other debates relating to IFRS 32 and 39  include the 
distinction between debt and equity as this distinction does not exist in the markets. Bond converts to equity 
under certain circumstances and vice versa. Under IFRS 32 what you could call equity may not be permitted 
under banking regulation. 
                                                               E)   CONCLUSION
The UK government has been criticised for  failing to give more protection to audit  stakeholders as the 
regulating accounting bodies often campaign to demand liability and other concessions for auditing firms.64 
It has also not fully considered why auditing firms would have any economic incentives to reflect on the 
negative consequences of their activities – especially in the absence of a “duty of care”.65 The Department of 
Trade and Industry, the DTI, having joint responsibility for regulating the UK auditing industry, has also 
been criticised for not having adequate staff to perform duties of  examining unexpected corporate collapses 
and frauds.66 
In contrast, Huepkes 67  argues that the threat of litigation could lead to further concentration in the auditing 
industry and also increase the trend towards defensive auditing – whereby audit partners tend to interpret 
rules  prescriptively  rather  than  exercising  subjective  judgement.  The  problems  at  Equitable  Life  and 
Independent Insurance in the UK, and the failures of Enron and others in the US with the demise of Arthur 
Andersen, one of the former Big Five accountancy practices has increased audit partners' awareness of risk 
and the consequences of making incorrect judgments.68 Directors, particularly non-executive directors are 
increasingly aware of the rewards and risks linked with greater responsibilities as a result of changes to the 
Combined Code of corporate governance following Higgs69 and Smith.70 The UK government noted these 
concerns and issued a consultation document on director and auditor liability.71 It can be said that unless 
efforts are made towards limiting liability, it could be harder or even impossible to employ the services of 
63  ibid
64   See House of Commons Select Treasury Committee, Further Memorandum Submitted by Professor Prem Sikka 
'The Institutionalisation of Audit Failures : Some Observations' at pg 21
65 ibid
66 ibid
67 See  EHG Huepkes  ' The External Auditor and the Bank Supervisor : Sherlock Holmes and Doctor Watson?' 
Journal of Banking Regulation, Volume 7 No 1 / 2 2005 at pg 10
68  ibid
69  D Higgs, Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors 2003 Department of Trade and Industry, 
London
70  R Smith Audit Committees Combined Code of Governance : A Report and Proposed Guidance by an FRC-
appointed group (2003) chaired by Sir Robert Smith FRC, London
71  The DTI document : DTI Director and Audit Liability : A Consultative Document, (2003b), London
external auditors and non executive directors of financial services without a substantial increase in their 
remuneration.72 Following  the  publication  of  the  Penrose  Report  and  potential  liabilities  surrounding 
Equitable Life, the specific role of auditors is an important research area.73
More work is needed to ensure that the role of the external auditor is better defined and that the possibility of 
unwarranted liabilities and risks are avoided. The growth of financial conglomerates and globalisation of 
capital markets has highlighted the need for a clearly defined role for auditing as a vehicle towards providing 
credibility to financial statements.74 In order to define this role clearly, International Standards on Auditing 
have been developed by International Federation of Accountants75 The International Accounting Standards 
Board  is  also  working  towards  providing  clearer  accounting  standards  towards  the  harmonisation  of 
standards around the world. This should help avoid corporate failures which arise as a result of improper 
application and treatment of accounting standards.
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